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WHO OWNS THE ATHLETE?: THE APPLICATION OF THE
TRANSFORMATIVE USE TEST IN THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY CONTEXT
Allison Hollows*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, college football game attendance reached nearly 49 million people for the year.1 Seeking to capitalize on the college football
frenzy, Electronic Arts, Inc. (“Electronic Arts”) created NCAA Football
2006. Already popular for its National Football League (“NFL”) simulation videogames, Electronic Arts would now give the fans the opportunity to control their hometown college or alma mater’s team.2 NCAA
Football 2006 simulates the college football experience, including stadiums, mascots, and players.3 The game places the user in control of the
team, allowing him or her to dictate the plays, decide the roster, and
determine recruitment for his or her fantasy team’s next season.4
Dedicated to realism and detail, NCAA Football 2006 includes
“‘over 100 virtual teams’ . . . populated by digital avatars that resemble
their real-life counterparts,” and share their “vital and biographical information.”5 Among the digital avatars, the Rutgers quarterback, number thirteen, is the digital twin of Ryan Hart.6 Like Hart, the avatar
weighs 197 pounds and stands six feet two inches tall.7 Certainly such
attention to detail fulfills Electronic Arts’ desire to simulate a realistic
experience by letting fans control the moves of digital copies of their
favorite teams and players. Ryan Hart, however, argued that the videogame company went too far, taking advantage of his persona for commercial gain.8 The dispute between the company and the player raises
*

J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Muhlenberg Col1
lege. Bryan Curtis, The National Pastime(s), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at WK5, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/weekinreview/01curtis.html?_r=0.
2
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141,146 (3d Cir. 2013).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Hart, 717 F.3d at 147.
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the question of when the use of a celebrity image becomes a misappropriation of that person’s own identity, rather than a unique creation of
the writers and developers in the videogame world. Central to the resolution of this dispute, as undertaken by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., is the reconciliation of the tension between the player’s right to his identity and
the videogame company’s right to its creative work.9
In Hart, a case of first impression for the Third Circuit, the court
sought to balance the interests of the Rutgers University quarterback,
Ryan Hart, in his identity, likeness, and celebrity and the interests of
Electronic Arts in developing and marketing a realistic college football
videogame.10 More specifically, the court had to balance the right of
publicity under intellectual property law that Hart claimed against
Electronic Arts’ interest in free expression under the First Amendment.11
The First Amendment prevents the suppression of speech, while
the right of publicity stops speech that takes advantage of another person’s interest in his or her own identity.12 Accordingly, the two interests
must be balanced so that valuable speech is not suppressed, and an
individual’s identity is not exploited, without his or her consent. The
Third Circuit’s determination in Hart of the way in which the interests
of the First Amendment and the right of publicity are balanced reflects
an application of the transformative use test.13 The decision, therefore,
may have far reaching implications, as this test, and the way in which it
is applied, will be the determinative factor in future right of publicity
cases. Thus far, a broad range of circumstances has implicated the
right of publicity, including: the use of Babe Ruth photographs in a
baseball calendar;14 a play in which performers simulate the style of the
Marx Brothers;15 a videogame character with mannerisms and spoken
phrases similar to those of a musician;16 and the use of baseball players’
names and stats in a fantasy league.17 Few courts, however, have directly
9

Id.
Id. at 148149.
11
Id at 148.
12
See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).
13
Hart, 717 F.3d at 163.
14
Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990).
15
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev’d on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
16
Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Ct. App. 2006).
17
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
10
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addressed the interplay between the right of publicity property interest
and free expression.18 The balancing of the property interest and free
expression is the same balancing of interests that copyright and trademark law address.19 Accordingly, the balancing in the right of publicity
context should mirror the balancing of the same interests in copyright
and trademark law.
This Comment, using Hart v. Electronic Arts as a starting point, argues that the balancing of interests undertaken in the right of publicity
context should mirror the balancing undertaken in other areas of intellectual property. Part II discusses the development of the right of
publicity and its clash with the First Amendment provision for freedom
of speech. Part II also examines the majority and dissenting opinions
in Hart. Part III provides a brief overview of the operative structures,
concerns, and criticisms in copyright and trademark law and their intersection with free speech and the First Amendment. Part IV argues
that the transformative use test should be interpreted to account for
the common interests underlying the right of publicity, copyright, and
trademark, particularly the commercial interests central to the discussion of the right of publicity and explicit in the balancing regimes of
copyright and trademark law. Part V concludes.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity protects an individual’s right to the exclusive commercial use of his or her name and likeness.20 Historically
based in the somewhat-analogous right to privacy tort, the right of publicity seeks to protect an individual from exploitation of that individual’s fame or notoriety without his or her consent.21 The right originates in the tort of “invasion of privacy by appropriation,” which
provides that an individual’s likeness, image, or identity cannot be
used by another without authorization.22 Put differently, one party cannot capitalize on the fame of another without his or her consent. Essentially, the right of publicity grants an individual a property interest
in his or her own identity.23

18

See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001)
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
20
See Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009).
21
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013).
22
Id. at 150 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
1:23 (2d ed. 2012)).
23
Id. (quoting Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch.
1907)).
19
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The application of the right of publicity is broad.24 Though traditionally exercised by celebrities, the right is available to all individuals.25
The use of a celebrity image as a false or misleading endorsement of a
product, for example, is a readily apparent application of the right of
publicity because the fame and household recognition accompanying
celebrity provides a building block upon which the creator of the new
work or product can capitalize.26 When baseball cards carry a cartoon
image of a famous baseball player, they are more enticing to fans than
a generic player image.27 By using a celebrity’s image or identity, the
creator of a new product can capitalize on a celebrity’s notoriety by
leading the consumer to believe that the celebrity has endorsed the
product.28
Multiple rationales support the right of publicity’s protection of
an individual’s interest in his or her own identity.29 These include: (1)
a judgment of moral disapproval for the appropriation of another’s
efforts, (2) an interest in the economic effect, and (3) an interest in
protecting consumers from false advertisements of endorsement.30
The moral rationale centers on societal disapproval for riding on the
coattails of a celebrity’s “time, effort, skill, and even money.”31 Meanwhile, the economic rationale focuses on incentivizing individuals to
“expend the time, effort and resources necessary to develop talents
and produce works that ultimately benefit society as a whole.”32 Finally,

24

See K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad, and the Right of
Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 536–38 (2008).
25
Id.
26
See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001)
(noting that “ depictions of celebrities amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s economic value are not protected expression under the First
Amendment”).
27
See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959
(10th Cir. 1996).
28
See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). The same set of
facts gave rise to both a Lanham Act claim under trademark law that the use of Rose
Parks’ name created a potential for consumer confusion and a right of publicity claim
for capitalizing on Rosa Parks’ name. Id. at 446, 45961.
29
See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 54 (1994).
30
Id.
31
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (“No social
purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that
would have market value and for which he would normally pay.”).
32
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 206 (1993).
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the consumer protection rationale is motivated by a desire to protect
consumers from advertisers who falsely present their product as being
endorsed by a particular celebrity.33
A. Balancing the Right of Publicity with the First Amendment
Though few courts have addressed the issue, the right of publicity
often conflicts with the First Amendment.34 This conflict has arisen in
disputes involving consumer products, such as trading cards,35 videogames,36 art work,37 and comic books.38 Free speech is raised as an affirmative defense in these right of publicity suits.39 The First Amendment protects speech from proscription by the government, yet, by
granting the protection for the right of publicity, the government allows the suppression of one individual’s speech in order to protect the
rights of the other.40 This tension creates conflict between the rights.
There is no question that videogames and similar entertainment
constitute “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment.41 The
United States Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment protects “entertainment [including, but certainly not limited to,]
motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live
entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works.”42 Specifically, the
Supreme Court has concluded that videogames are protected within
the bounds of the First Amendment as they “communicate ideas—and
even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as
characters, dialogue, plot, and music), and through features distinctive
to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual

33

See id. at 23132.
See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001)
(“Although surprisingly few courts have considered in any depth the means of reconciling the right of publicity and the First Amendment, we follow those that have in
concluding that depictions of celebrities amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s economic value are not protected expression under the First
Amendment.”).
35
See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.
1996).
36
See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
37
See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918, 92425, 93738 (6th Cir.
2003).
38
See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
39
See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 810; DC Comics, 69 P.3d at 47778.
40
See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2002).
41
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
42
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 14950 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Tacynec
v. City of Phila., 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982)).
34
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world).”43 Once it is established that a work, words, or conduct is
“speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment, the next step is
to determine how to balance the protection afforded by that Amendment against competing interests.44
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court
examined the intersection of the First Amendment and right of publicity in the context of a news broadcast of a performance at a fair.45
Zacchini, a human cannonball, filed suit against a news network that
broadcast the entirety of his performance.46 The Court determined
that the news network’s conduct violated Zacchini’s right of publicity.47
The Court recognized that the right of publicity was a property right,
akin to that in intellectual property, stating that “the State’s interest in
permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary interest
of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.”48
The purpose of protecting the right of publicity, the Court reasoned,
was to prevent unjust enrichment.49 The Court found that the goal of
the right of publicity is “analogous to the goals of patent and copyright
law” in that they serve to protect an individual’s ability to “reap the
reward of his endeavors.”50 The Court stated that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights” is that providing economic protection for the end-product
encourages the effort to develop the talent, skill, or art.51 In its reasoning, the Court highlighted that the protection provided by the right of
publicity—of the performer’s economic interests—provided an economic incentive for the investment in the performance production,
and that this was the same consideration of incentive for production
underlying copyright law.52
In ruling in favor of the human cannonball, the Court held that:
[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are
not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
Hart, 717 F.3d at 150.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Id. at 563.
Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 573.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Steins, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
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entire act without his consent. The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would
privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted
dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner.53
According to the Court, ultimately, the harm done by the news broadcast, and the violation of the right of publicity, were economic disincentives for development of a skill.54 The human cannonball act “[was]
the product of [Zacchini’s] own talents and energy, the end result of
much time, effort, and expense.”55 The Court noted that if the public
saw the newscast, allowing them to view the performance for free, then
they would not pay to view that same performance.56 Accordingly, the
Court held that the news broadcast deprived Zacchini of the economic
value of his performance.57 Since then, three different tests have been
used58 in attempting to find the appropriate balance between the right
of publicity and the First Amendment: the predominant use test, the
Rogers test, and the transformative use test.
1. The Predominant Use Test
While not widely accepted, the predominant use test, which appeared first in Doe v. TCI Cablevision, asks whether the predominant
purpose of the work is commercial rather than expressive.59 If the predominant purpose is commercial, then the work is not protected by
the First Amendment.60 Specifically, the test states that regardless of
whether there is some expressive purpose of the work, if the product
predominantly “exploits the commercial value of an individual’s identity,” it violates the right of publicity and is not protected by the First
Amendment.61 By contrast, if the work is predominantly “an expressive
comment on or about a celebrity” then it may be protected.62

53

Id. at 57475 (emphasis added).
Id. at 575.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 57576.
58
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v.
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363
(Mo. 2003). There is an additional smattering of cases that takes an ad hoc approach,
which this Comment will not discuss.
59
See Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 374 (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the
Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)).
62
Id.
54
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2. The Rogers Test
The Rogers test, also referred to as the relatedness test or the restatement test, examines the relationship between the “celebrity image
and work as a whole.”63 Originating in the trademark case of Rogers v.
Grimaldi in the Second Circuit,64 the test asks whether the use of the
celebrity’s name, or image, is “wholly unrelated” to the work.65 The
Rogers court looked at a movie titled “Ginger and Fred,” in which the
central characters were named “Ginger” and “Fred” after Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.66 The Court concluded that “these names [were]
not arbitrarily chosen just to exploit the publicity value of their real life
counterparts but instead [had] genuine relevance to the film’s story”
and were, therefore, protected.67
The Sixth Circuit applied the Rogers test in Parks v. LaFace Records.68
In Parks, Rosa Parks, civil rights icon, brought suit against LaFace Records, a record producer, and music duo OutKast for the use of her
name as a song title on the album “Aquemini.”69 In determining
whether OutKast’s right to free expression protected it from Rosa
Parks’ claim of violation of the right of publicity, the Sixth Circuit first
applied the Rogers test to determine the validity of Rosa Parks’ trademark infringement claim.70 The Sixth Circuit found a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the use of Rosa Parks’ name “[was] artistically related to the content of the song or whether the use of the name
Rosa Parks [was] nothing more than a misleading advertisement for
the sale of the song.”71 Courts have been reluctant, however, to extend
the Rogers test beyond consideration of the title of a work.72 One month
after the Parks decision, the Sixth Circuit decided another right of publicity case, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., using the transformative
use test.73

63

Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013).
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989); see infra Part III.B. (examining the balancing of the trademark intellectual property interest against freedom
of expression).
65
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
66
Id. at 1001.
67
Id.
68
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
69
Id. at 441–42.
70
Id. at 451.
71
Id. at 456.
72
Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008).
73
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
64
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3. The Transformative Use Test
The final, and more widely accepted, approach taken in balancing
the competing interests is the transformative use test. In Comedy III
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., a suit for copyright infringement
brought against a rap music group, the California Supreme Court imported the transformative use test from copyright law.74 According to
the Comedy III court, “the inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.”75 Ultimately, the transformative use
test asks “whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression
rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”76 Because the Court provided
minimal guidance as to the correct interpretation of the “purpose and
use” language, the transformative use test has been applied in multiple
ways by multiple courts.
In Winter v. DC Comics, the California Supreme Court applied the
transformative use test to a case in which a comic book took the identifiable persona of the Winter brothers, singers Edgar and Johnny Winter, and created the Autumn brothers, half-human, half-worm-like
creatures.77 Expressing the test as requiring that “[a]n artist depicting
a celebrity must contribute something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation [but must create] something recognizably ‘his own’ in order to
qualify for legal protection,”78 the Winter court concluded that while
the “fictional characters Johnny and Edgar Autumn [were] less-thansubtle evocations of Johnny and Edgar Winter, the books d[id] not depict plaintiffs literally.”79 Furthermore, “the Autumn brothers [were]
but cartoon characters – half-human and half-worm – in a larger story,
which [wa]s itself quite expressive.”80 In this case, not only were the
celebrity images placed in a new world, but the celebrities themselves
were transformed into fantastical creatures.
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., the Sixth Circuit applied the
transformative use test to a photograph of Tiger Woods within a collage.81 The photograph itself was an un-transformed photograph of

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477–78 (Cal. 2003).
Id.at 478 (citing Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d 797).
Id. at 479.
Id.
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
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Woods.82 The ETW court, however, concluded that the collage included significant transformative elements83 as it did not focus solely
on Woods, but rather, “consist[ed] of a collage of images in addition
to Wood’s image which [were] combined to describe, in artistic form,
a historic event in sports history and to convey a message about the
significance of Wood’s achievement in that event.”84 This application
of the transformative use test focused on the entirety of the work in
which the unaltered celebrity image was placed.
In Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the California Court of Appeals
applied the transformative use test in the context of videogames.85 The
Kirby court concluded that Sega’s creation of the character of Ulala,
while similar with respect to spoken phrases, clothing, and appearance
to musician Kierin Kirby, was protected by the First Amendment because “Ulala was not a mere digital recreation of Kirby.”86 Instead, the
creators used the celebrity image as fodder for the character creation.87
This application of the transformative use test had elements of both an
altered world and altered celebrity image.
In No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., the Court of Appeal of
California also examined the right to publicity within the videogame
context, however, this time the application of the transformative use
test yielded the conclusion that the work was not protected.88 The No
Doubt court concluded that “no matter what else occurs in the game
[Band Hero] during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the avatars
perform rock songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and
maintains its fame.”89 No transformative elements were apparent in No
Doubt as neither the environment in which the celebrity image was
placed, nor the image itself, was altered. Ultimately, however, few
courts have directly addressed the appropriate way in which to balance
the competing interests of the right of publicity and the First Amendment.90

82

Id. at 938.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006).
86
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Kirby, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 613).
87
Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
88
No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011)
89
Id. at 41011.
90
See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001).
83
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B. Right of Publicity Balancing in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
In a case of first impression, the Third Circuit sought to reconcile
the parties’ opposing interests in publicity and freedom of speech, and
to determine the test most appropriate to be used in the future.91 After
determining the proper test to be applied, the Hart court then ruled
on the appropriate application of that test.92 The task of striking the
appropriate balance between the interests at issue was made more difficult by the lack of applicable case law, as the right of publicity itself is
relatively new.
1. Background of Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
Electronic Arts, Inc., founded in 1982, is “one of the world’s leading interactive entertainment software companies.”93 It “develops, publishes, and distributes interactive software worldwide” for consoles, cell
phones, and PCs.94 After success in NFL football videogames, Electronic Arts created a college version, NCAA Football 2006.95 Largely
based on realism, the NCAA Football franchise recreates sounds, game
mechanics, and team mascots.96 The virtual teams are filled with avatars resembling their real-life counterparts, including vital and biographical statistics.97
From the 2002 season through the 2005 season, Ryan Hart wore
number thirteen for the Rutgers Scarlet Knights, the Rutgers University National Collegiate Athletics Association (“NCAA”) Men’s Division
I Football team.98 At six feet and two inches tall and weighing 197
pounds, Ryan Hart held the position of starting quarterback, and still
holds the school records for career attempts, completions, and interceptions.99 Accordingly, the Rutgers quarterback in NCAA Football
2006, wears the number thirteen, is six feet and two inches tall, weighs

91

While the Tenth, Eighth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all addressed the balance between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, neither the Third Circuit nor a New Jersey court has previously weighed in. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cars, 599
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d
915 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959 (10th
Cir. 1996).
92
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2013).
93
Id. at 146.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Hart, 717 F.3d at 145.
99
Id.
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197 pounds, and shares the same hometown and general physical features with Ryan Hart.100 Notably, while appearance and statistics may
be changed by the videogame player, the avatar’s home state, home
town, team, and class year may not be altered.101
Electronic Arts obtains licenses from the NCAA’s licensing agent,
the Collegiate Licensing Company, that include “the right to use member school names, team names, uniforms, logos, stadium fight songs,
and other game elements.”102 Unlike other franchises, however, Electronic Arts does not obtain a license for the players’ likenesses and
identities.103 This is likely due, in large part, to the NCAA rules that
require all NCAA players to be “amateurs.”104 Under NCAA rules, in
order to be eligible for intercollegiate athletics, the student-athlete
must be considered an “amateur.”105 This means that the student may
not take advantage of commercial opportunities, because amateur status is lost if the athlete: (1) “[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or
indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport”106 or (2) “[a]ccepts any
remuneration or permits the use of his or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind.”107 Accordingly, Ryan Hart and similar college athletes would not be able to accept any form of payment
or licensing agreement offered by Electronic Arts.108
Additionally, the NCAA places an affirmative burden on the student athletes to keep their names and images out of commercial use.109
According to the NCAA manual, where a college athlete’s
name or picture appears on commercial items . . . or is used
to promote a commercial product sold by an individual or
agency without the student-athlete’s knowledge or permission, the student athlete (or institution acting on behalf of
the student-athlete) is required to take steps to stop such an
activity in order to retain his or her eligibility for intercollegiate athletics.110
100

Id. at 146.
Id.
102
Id. at 146 n.5.
103
Id. In its NFL series videogames, Electronic Arts pays for the right to use the
professional football players’ likenesses. Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 n.5.
104
NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.1.1 (2011), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf.
105
Id.
106
Id. at § 12.1.2.
107
Id. at § 12.5.2.
108
See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146.
109
NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL at § 12.5.2.2.
110
Id.
101
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This rule provided further incentive for Ryan Hart to seek to prevent
Electronic Arts from commercially benefiting from his image.
Ryan Hart brought suit against Electronic Arts, alleging that the
clearly identifiable use of his likeness in the game violated his right of
publicity.111 For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, Electronic Arts conceded that it had violated Hart’s right of publicity
through the use of his image and personal characteristics in the 2004,
2005, and 2006 NCAA Football video games.112 Electronic Arts contended, however, that it was entitled to summary judgment on First
Amendment grounds.113
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Electronic Arts, holding that the game, NCAA Football, was entitled to First
Amendment protection and therefore was “shielded from right of publicity claims by the First Amendment.”114 Hart appealed and the majority of the Third Circuit held in his favor.115
2. Determinations of the Majority
Acknowledging that courts have different balancing approaches
in addressing the tension between free expression and protecting the
right of publicity, the majority noted that it must first look at the interests that need to be balanced, then consider the different approaches
taken by courts “to resolv[e] the tension between the First Amendment
and the right of publicity.”116 To determine “whether the interest in
safeguarding the right of publicity overpowers the interest in safeguarding free expression,”117 the majority looked at the predominant
use test and the Rogers test before deciding that application of the transformative use test best balances publicity and free speech.118
The Hart court rejected the predominant use test as “subjective at
best and arbitrary at worst.”119 According to the court, application
would require the judge to act as both impartial jurist and discerning
art critic.120 Furthermore, adoption of the predominant use test, the

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011).
Id. at 766.
Id.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2013).
See id. at 145.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
See id. at 15363.
Id. at 154.
Hart, 717 F.3d. at 154.
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Hart court explained, would “suppose that there exists a broad range
of seemingly expressive speech that has no First Amendment Value.”121
The Hart court then found the Rogers test unsuitable here because
it is not carefully calibrated to balance two fundamental protections:
“the right of free expression and the right to control, manage, and
profit from one’s own identity.”122 The court indicated that application
of the test would yield nonsensical results. The court explained that
because Ryan Hart was a college football player, his likeness is, as a
matter of course, related to NCAA Football.123 Because the game and his
celebrity are related, the game is not a commercial advertisement for
some unrelated product. Accordingly, Hart would fail the Rogers test.124
This outcome, however, was unacceptable because “[i]t [could not] be
that the very activity by which Appellant achieved his renown now prevents him from protecting his hard-won celebrity.”125
Ultimately accepting the transformative use test, the Hart court
explained that a balance can be struck between a celebrity’s right to
profit from his image and the value of the new expressive work by looking at the “the purpose and character of the use.”126 If the work contains “significant transformative elements,” the court reasoned, it is
“less likely to interfere with the economic interests implicated by the
right of publicity.”127 In applying the test, the Hart majority concluded
that, like in No Doubt, the digital avatar mirrored the real Ryan Hart:
they both play football in college football stadiums, “filled with all the
trappings of a college football game. This is not transformative; various digitized sights and sounds . . . do not alter or transform the
[player]’s identity in a significant way.”128
In applying the transformative use test to Hart, the court found
that it must focus on “the specific aspects of the work that speak to
whether it was merely created to exploit a celebrity’s likeness.”129 The
court noted that the avatar matches Hart in hair color and style, skin
tone, and accessories worn. It also mirrors Hart’s vital and biographical statistics.130 The court then noted that in order to find some transformative element, it “must look somewhere other than just the in121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
Hart, 717 F.3d at 159.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 163.
Id.at 166.
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game digital recreation.”131 The court stated that it must look at context, but dismissed Electronic Arts’ suggestion that other creative elements in the game are so numerous as to render the work transformative.132 The court stated that “[d]ecisions applying the [t]ransformative
[u]se [t]est invariably look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is
altered by other aspects of the work. Wholly unrelated elements do
not bear on this inquiry.”133 The majority’s analysis of whether or not
the videogame was transformative focused closely on the image of Ryan
Hart himself, looking at that specific aspect of the game.
3. Judge Ambro’s Dissenting Application of the
Transformative Use Test
In his dissent, Judge Ambro agreed that the transformative use
test was the operative test to balance publicity and free speech, but
concluded that the work must be looked at as a whole rather than as
the use of the individual by itself.134 He stated that “[t]o determine
whether an individual’s identity has been ‘transformed’ for purposes
of the Transformative Use Test, I believe it is necessary to review the
likeness in the context of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing
only on the individual’s likeness.”135
Judge Ambro explained that application of the test to the work as
a whole is consistent with the application taken by the architect of the
transformative use test, the California Supreme Court.136 Furthermore,
the dissent compared application of transformative use in publicity to
the way it is applied in books and art, stating that the test “must mesh
with existing constitutional protections for works of expression.”137
The Winter court emphasized that the comic contains “significant expressive content other than plaintiffs’ mere likeness” and noted that
the characters are placed within a larger story, “which is itself quite

131

Id.
Id. at 166–67.
133
Hart, 717 F.3d at 169.
134
See id. at 171 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
135
Id.
136
See id.
137
Id. (citing Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994); Ruffin-Steinbeck v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp.2d 723 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949
F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) in support of the conclusion that constitutional protection cannot be diminished simply “because a celebrity’s name or likeness was used to increase a product’s
value and marketability”).
132
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expressive.”138 ETW featured a photograph of Tiger Woods.139 The actual image of Woods had not been altered at all, but rather, the majority noted that it received protection because “the collage ‘contain[ed]
significant transformative elements.’”140
Concluding that Electronic Arts’ use of realistic avatars merited
First Amendment protection, the dissent noted the “myriad of original
graphics, videos, sound effects, and game scenarios,” which allow a
user to either dictate the play of a college team or create an entirely
new team.141 Judge Ambro reasoned that attempting to separate Hart’s
image from the creative elements of the game as a whole “disregards
NCAA Football’s many expressive features beyond an avatar having characteristics similar to Hart.”142 Further, “[h]is likeness is transformed by
the artistry necessary to create a digitally rendered avatar within the
imaginative and interactive world EA has placed that avatar.”143
III. BALANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTERESTS AGAINST FREE
EXPRESSION
The same tension, between an intellectual property interest and
free expression, arises under copyright and trademark law and is settled by way of internal doctrinal mechanisms.144 While the doctrine of
these intellectual property categories seeks to balance precisely the
same tension, they have developed in different ways with different
checks, values, concerns, and considerations.145 Nonetheless, the balancing of these developed intellectual property doctrines may yield valuable insight and consideration for the balancing undertaken in the
right of publicity context.

138

Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003).
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
140
Hart, 717 F.3d at 173.
141
Id. at 175.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 7.
145
See Kwall, supra note 29, at 58. Kwall explains that while copyright law and the
right of publicity may be analogous, they are different both in their “theoretical underpinnings and objectives. Thus, the incorporation of a copyright law doctrine as the
springboard for analysis in the First Amendment/right of publicity dilemma will result
in the adoption of an imprecise analytical framework and potentially inappropriate
outcomes.”
139
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A. Copyright Law
The purpose of copyright is to promote both the creation and
publication of expression, just as the purpose of the right of publicity
is to promote investment in development of a skill.146 The Supreme
Court explains that “[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create
and disseminate ideas.”147 Multiple elements of the fair use defense
look at the economic nature and impact of the new work in comparison with the original.148
Copyright law is firmly rooted in statutory construction and has a
long precedential history.149 The Supreme Court has determined that
any tension between the First Amendment and copyright law has been
addressed by the two limitations placed on copyright: (1) the idea versus expression dichotomy and (2) the fair use defense.150 The idea versus expression dichotomy states that the “idea” giving rise to the work
is part of the public domain while the “expression” produced by the
individual is protected by copyright.151 Accordingly, it is only the expression itself that is protected.152 In order for there to be a copyright
infringement, the work must be deemed “expression.”153 The fair use
defense is a determination that a use of a work is not an infringement
on the copyright.154 The fair use defense, codified in section 107 of the
1976 Copyright Act, requires the evaluation of:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of commercial nature . . . ; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.155
The elements provide guidance from which the court can make the
determination that the use of the original work in the new work is
146

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985)).
148
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
149
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 1113.
150
Id. at 12.
151
Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV.
321, 323 (1989).
152
Id.
153
Id. at 324.
154
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern Oriented Approach to Fair-Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525, 1554 (2004).
155
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
147
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“fair,” meaning that it is not an infringement.156 The determination
involves consideration not only of “the purpose and character of the
use” from which the transformative use test is derived,157 but also
whether the use is of a commercial nature for economic gain.158 The
second element considers the nature of the work, whether it is commercial, educational, or instructional.159 The third element looks at
how much of the original work has been incorporated into the new
work in question, while the fourth factor explicitly inquires into the
market impact of the appropriation.160 Additionally, distinctions may
be drawn between commercial and noncommercial use,161 transformative and non-transformative use,162 and productive and non-productive
use, all of which increase the difficulty of the fair use determination.163
Recent court discourse has seen an increase in the discussion of
transformative use,164 embodied in the first half of the first factor of the
fair use defense.165 For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.,166
in which the owner of a rock ballad sued a rap music group for copyright infringement, the court cited with approval Judge Pierre Leval’s
article Toward a Fair Use Standard,167 which supports increased attention
to transformative use within the fair use test as providing broader protection for First Amendment interests.168
The Supreme Court has found that copyright’s built-in free
speech safeguards are “generally adequate,”169 and has expressed confidence in copyright’s internal checks addressing issues of free speech,
rather than constitutional scrutiny.170 The critique of copyright juris-

156

Madison, supra note 154, at 1558.
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 15960 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining the
development of the transformative use test in Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup,
Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)).
158
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
159
See id.
160
See id.
161
Madison, supra note 154, at 1558 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 45051 (1984)).
162
Madison, supra note 154, at 1558 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
163
Madison, supra note 154, at 155859.
164
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 12–13.
165
Id. at 13.
166
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
167
Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
168
See Bartholomew and Tehranian, supra note 12, at 13.
169
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
170
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 89091 (2012).
157
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prudence is that it is a test of necessity and that the original copyrighted work must be intrinsic to the new work’s message in order for
the new work to be allowed.171 The fact remains, however, that the “fair
use” defense is relatively broad, providing protection for not only the
use of facts and ideas, but also, in certain circumstances, the expression
contained in the copyrighted work.172 Copyrighted work can be copied, without violation, for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research . . . .”173 In fact, according to the Supreme Court, copyright’s
fair use defense provides “latitude for scholarship and comment,”174
“and even for parody.”175
B. Trademark Law
Just as the right of publicity and copyright law emphasize economic interests, trademark law, too, seeks to promote economic efficiency. Trademark law focuses on minimizing the likelihood of consumer confusion in the marketplace, thereby promoting economic
efficiency. As professors Mark Bartholomew and John Tehranian
stated, in their comprehensive comparison of intellectual property
frameworks, “[t]he promotion of economic efficiency serves as the
dominant rationale for trademark rights and is achieved by minimizing
the likelihood of consumer confusion in the marketplace.”176 Unlike
the right of publicity, trademark law implicates the potential for consumer confusion.177 In contrast to copyright’s strict historical tradition,
trademark law has been more flexible, sometimes allowing for the production of new doctrine to accommodate speech.178 But trademark law
is similar to copyright law in its reliance on internal mechanisms to
address issues of free expression.179 The new mechanisms for infringement evaluation, however, are then placed within the traditional view
171

See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 13 (discussing the difference
between protected parody and unprotected satire).
172
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
173
Id. at 21920 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(2012)).
174
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
175
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994) (holding that a rap group’s musical parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty
Woman” may be fair use)).
176
Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 41. See Mark Bartholomew, Making
a Mark in the Internet Economy: A Trademark Analysis of Search Engine Advertising, 58 OKLA.
L. REV. 179, 19596 (2005); Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1601, 161415 (2010).
177
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
178
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 7981.
179
Id. at 41.
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of the purpose of trademark law, effectively narrowing their interpretation.180 Recent court decisions have occasionally directly addressed
First Amendment issues.181
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the court developed a new test to determine
trademark infringement.182 While, as discussed supra, the Rogers test
was later appropriated for use in the right of publicity context, it originally developed within the trademark framework.183 Within trademark
law, prior tests had simply asked whether the title was likely to confuse
consumers, or whether the filmmaker could have made his or her
point in other ways.184 The new test asks whether “the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, [whether] the title explicitly misleads as to the source
or content of the work.”185
Generally, two questions are asked under the Rogers test: “(1)
whether use of the plaintiff’s trademark is ‘artistically relevant’ to the
defendant’s work; and (2) whether use of the plaintiff’s trademark is
‘explicitly misleading.’”186 Artistic relevance is interpreted broadly,
with deference given to the defendant.187 The phrase “explicitly misleading” is taken to mean that “defendant’s work must make some affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement beyond the mere use of plaintiff’s name or other characteristic.”188
Keeping the burden on the plaintiff and requiring an additional affirmative statement by the defendant renders the Rogers test particularly protective of speech.189
Trademark law, however, also requires consideration of the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.190 This limits the availability of a First Amendment defense to a trademark infringement claim. In Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., the Third Circuit
180

See id.
See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 127679
(11th Cir. 2012); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 31314 (4th Cir. 2005).
182
See Rogers, 875 F.2d 994.
183
For a discussion of how this test was later borrowed for use in the right of publicity context as in Parks v. LaFace, see supra Part II.A.2.
184
Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 48.
185
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
186
Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 49 (quoting E.S.S. Entm’t 2000,
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008)).
187
Id.
188
Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 1:09–cv–1236, 2011 WL 2457678, at *6
(S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001; E.S.S. Entm’t, 547 F.3d at
1101).
189
Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 50.
190
See id. at 52.
181
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determined that where the defendant’s use of a mark is commercial
speech, there is no First Amendment defense.191 In trademark law,
once an activity is considered commercial, the violation is evaluated
within trademark law’s own framework and is no longer considered to
directly implicate the First Amendment.192
IV. DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE BALANCING SCHEME
From the first case addressing the right of publicity, the Supreme
Court noted that the right of publicity was a property right akin to that
in intellectual property; the Court found that the goal of the right of
publicity is “analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law,” in that
they serve to protect an individual’s ability to “reap the reward of his
endeavors.”193 In the most recent case addressing the right of publicity
and the First Amendment, , Judge Ambro stated for the Third Circuit
that the “[t]ransformative use [test] must mesh with existing constitutional protections for works of expression.”194 Examining the work of
previous decisions in various courts, the Third Circuit attempted to determine the appropriate test and interpretation.195 Settling on the
transformative use test, the majority in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. applied a narrow interpretation to the requirement of transformation,
concluding that the First Amendment did not protect the defendant
from its admitted violation of the right of publicity.196
This narrow reading is commensurate with the balancing undertaken in both copyright and trademark law. Recognized by the Supreme Court as employing adequate balancing of interests, the framework employed in copyright recognizes both the interest in free
expression of the defendant and the economic interests of the property protection.197 While the Third Circuit’s ultimate determination
echoed the narrow free expression exception to copyright violations,
the analysis that the court employed did not reference the strong economic considerations underpinning not only the right of publicity, but
also copyright and trademark law.198 In order to adequately balance

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008).
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 80.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
See id. at 153161.
Id. at 169.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
Cf. Hart, 717 F.3d at 163166.
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the competing interests of the right of publicity and free expression,
the commercial interests at play should be recognized just as they are
in copyright and trademark law.
In contrast to copyright’s rigid framework, the right of publicity’s
single factor test, looking at the degree of transformation of the celebrity, is exceedingly flexible.199 But this flexibility allows the transformative use test to be attuned to the tension of interests between the property holder, the celebrity, and the speaker. The flexibility also allows
the right of publicity to be interpreted in a way that is consistent with
the other intellectual properties200 to account for their balancing of
parallel interests.201
The balance between the right of publicity and the First Amendment must be carefully calibrated because “the very importance of celebrities in society means that the right of publicity has the potential of
censoring significant expression by suppressing alternative versions of
celebrity images that are iconoclastic, irreverent or otherwise attempt
to redefine the celebrity’s meaning.”202 The Supreme Court, however,
has found that copyright law’s built-in free speech safeguards are “generally adequate,”203 and expressed confidence in copyright law’s internal checks addressing issues of free speech, rather than constitutional
scrutiny.204
The transformative use test is derived from the first prong of copyright’s fair use test.205 The interests and incentives that frame the construction of copyright law should therefore be reflected in the understanding of the right of publicity. The underlying economic incentive
for the protection of the right of publicity is for the individual to make
“the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the
public.”206 The same interest underlies copyright law since a copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free expression: “The Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of
free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

See supra Part II.A.3.
Hart, 717 F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 197–198.
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 89091 (2012).
Id.; see17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
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disseminate ideas.”207 Accordingly, the interpretation of the transformative use test should mirror the balancing undertaken in the copyright
and trademark context, as they are protecting the same interests.
Copyright law places primary importance on “protecting a plaintiff’s right to exploit potential licensing markets, even in the face of a
First Amendment defense.”208 Multiple elements of the fair use defense
look at the economic nature and impact of the new work in comparison with the original.209 In the scheme of copyright, market concerns
take center stage. Half of the fair use defense explicitly evaluates economic considerations: “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of commercial nature,” and “the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”210
Trademark law similarly emphasizes commercial concerns because the main inquiry seeks to protect business identity and asks
whether a consumer may be confused by the use of the mark.211 “The
promotion of economic efficiency serves as the dominant rationale for
trademark rights and is achieved by minimizing the likelihood of consumer confusion in the marketplace.”212 Trademark law looks at the
specific mark by itself, similar to the majority’s focus on the specific use
of the celebrity image, and asks whether there would be consumer confusion213—whether a consumer would think that the new work is connected with the familiar brand holding that mark. Similarly, in the
right of publicity context, application of the consumer confusion principle would yield the question of whether there would be confusion
that the celebrity endorsed the new work. In other words, the court
should consider whether use of the celebrity image in the new work is
so unaltered, untransformed, and recognizable as to cause the audience to believe that the celebrity himself is connected to the new work.
Direct consideration of the economic interests, as in trademark law,
would ensure that the understanding and application of transformative use clearly addresses the economic interest grounding the right of
publicity.

207

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
208
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 21.
209
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
210
Id.
211
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 80.
212
Id. See also Bartholomew, supra note 176, at 195–96; Katyal, supra note 176, at
1614–15.
213
Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 41.
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The centrality of the economic interest in the right of publicity,
or in this case, the economic effect of the use of a celebrity’s image or
identity, is important to consider as part of the balancing of property
and free speech interests.214 It is one of the three rationales providing
a base for the protection of the right of publicity, and scholars have
argued that the central reason for protection of the right of publicity
is to preserve a celebrity’s right to commercial gain from their own
person.215 In Zacchini, the Supreme Court approved of the right of publicity as an economic incentive for individuals to develop a performance or persona.216 The centrality of economics to both the reasoning behind the right of publicity and the analysis applied in other
intellectual property doctrines indicates that commercial gain should
be factored into the considerations in balancing the breach of right of
publicity and the interests of the First Amendment. While economics
is not the only consideration for the right of publicity, in contrast to
trademark law, and it is not even explicitly part of the test, in contrast
to copyright law, it is part of the larger scheme of intellectual property
in which the right of publicity is placed.217 Accordingly, the critiques
and understandings of these developed intellectual property doctrines
may yield valuable insight and consideration for developing the appropriate balancing in the right of publicity context.
Despite the extensive similarities between the right of publicity,
copyright law, and trademark law, the right of publicity lacks the history of statutory construction of trademark and copyright law.218 This
difference allows right of publicity discourse to be receptive to the development of an interpretation similar to the other intellectual properties.219 This means that the right of publicity, and the transformative
use test specifically, is left with a great deal of vagueness in how it is to
be properly applied; at the same time, there is flexibility within looking
at the “purpose and use” to apply the transformative use test so that it

214

See Kwall, supra note 29, at 55.
See id. The labor and unjust enrichment justifications focus on taking away or
denying the celebrity economic gain earned from his persona. Critics, however, argue
that these justifications are overstated as the individual would have no earning potential without the media, audience, and culture of celebrity creating a marketable identity. Id.
216
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575576 (1977).
217
See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 12, at 3.
218
See id. at 8.
219
See id.
215
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is consistent with the balancing undertaken in copyright and trademark law.220 Accordingly, the transformative use test may be read narrowly to directly account for the economic interests at the heart of intellectual property.
Ultimately, though approaching the economic interests indirectly, the Hart majority decided that if the work contains “significant
transformative elements . . . it is less likely to interfere with the economic interests implicated by the right of publicity.”221 This interpretation provides a narrow First Amendment exception to right of publicity infringement that is consistent with the understanding that the
right of publicity is similar to copyright.222 Copyright law places primary importance on “protecting a plaintiff’s right to exploit potential
licensing markets, even in the face of a First Amendment defense.”223
It is also consistent with the underlying interest in protecting the economic incentive to develop a skill or identity that undergirds both the
right of publicity and copyright: as “[t]he Framers intended copyright
itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas”224 and the “same consideration underlies . . . copyright laws long enforced by [the Supreme]
Court.”225 Therefore, the interpretation of the transformative use test
as applied by the Hart majority should be adopted in the right of publicity context, with the additional understanding of the prominence
that economic interests play in the intellectual property balancing
scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
The right of publicity does not have a great deal of precedent defining its interpretation and scope. This lack of history provides flexibility in determining the appropriate way in which to balance the competing issues: the right of publicity’s property interest versus the First
220

See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing different courts’ applications of “purpose and
use” within the transformative use test).
221
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159 (3d Cir. 2013).
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See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001)
(“Although surprisingly few courts have considered in any depth the means of reconciling the right of publicity and the First Amendment, we follow those that have in
concluding that depictions of celebrities amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s economic value are not protected expression under the First
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Amendment free expression. Despite the right of publicity’s lack of
precedent, however, both copyright and trademark law have fully developed frameworks that balance identical interests. Accordingly, the
affirmative defense of free expression for a violation of the right of
publicity should be narrowly available, as provided by the majority in
Hart, to echo its availability in the other areas of intellectual property.
Additionally, attention should be paid to the strong economic interests
at stake, which the intellectual property schemes seek to protect.

